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Abstract  
International politics affects oil trade. But does it affect the oil-exporting developing countries more? 
We construct a firm-level dataset for all U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2008 to examine how 
these firms respond to changes in “political distance” between the U.S. and her trading partners, 
measured by divergence in their UN General Assembly voting patterns. Consistent with previous 
macro evidence, we first show that individual firms diversify their oil imports politically, even after 
controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We conjecture that the political pattern of oil imports 
from these individual firms is driven by hold-up risks, because oil trade is often associated with 
backward vertical FDI. To the extent that developing countries have higher hold-up risks because of 
their weaker institutions, the political effect on oil trade should be more significant in the 
developing world. We find that oil import decisions are indeed more elastic when firms import from 
developing countries, although the reverse is true in the short run. Our results suggest that 
international politics can affect oil revenue and hence long-term development in the developing 
world. 
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1. Introduction 
Oil investment by multinational companies is one of the oldest forms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the developing world. When there is more trade internationally in 
crude oil than any other goods in modern times, oil exports from developing countries 
are of particular interests. Partly because of their heavy dependence on a single 
commodity export, national saving in these developing countries appears to be strongly 
linked to the foreign demand for oil. Moreover, when the oil sector of many of the 
developing countries are monopolized by their government, oil revenue becomes a major 
source of government revenue, and hence fluctuation in oil exports has direct impacts 
on government investment as well as welfare spending in these countries. 
In this paper, we consider a particular source of uncertainty that affects oil 
exports from the developing world, namely the risk of international politics. Since 
Churchill’s days, the key to “energy security” in the industrial world has been thought 
to be oil diversification, and this belief has provided justification for many advanced 
economies to develop overseas oil-development policy to ensure equity oil that can be 
imported readily.3 Recent empirical work on the pattern of import diversification has 
confirmed that international politics has a distinctive impact on oil trade. In particular, 
macro evidence shows that unlike many other traded goods, major-power countries with 
oil investment overseas diversify their oil imports significantly away from their political 
enemies (Mityakov, Tang, and Tsui, 2013). In a companion paper, we find that even 
when import decision is highly decentralized, American firms also diversify their oil 
imports politically (Kashcheeva and Tsui, 2014). However, little is known about whether 
                                                   
3 The idea of energy security can be traced back to the time when Winston Churchill 
changed coal to oil as a power source for the Royal Navy prior to the First World War. 
According to Churchill, “Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone” (55 Parl. 
Deb., H.C. [5th ser.] [1913] 1465 [U.K.]). 
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this political effect on oil trade is larger or smaller when the exporting countries are 
developing ones. 
There are several reasons to expect why the trade effect of international politics 
are different when the oil-exporting countries are developing ones. For instance, 
Mityakov, Tang, and Tsui (2013) show that the political effect on oil trade is 
concentrated among the subsample of nondemocratic countries with higher 
expropriation risk. Mityakov, Tang, and Tsui conjectured that oil imports are affected by 
political risk because oil trade is often associated with backward vertical FDI, which is 
subject to selective discrimination risks, such as tax renegotiation and expropriation. 
Oil production involves massive upfront investments in exploration, and geological 
knowledge is country- or even oilfield-specific. In the presence of sizeable appropriable 
quasi rent (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978), it is common for bilateral oil trade to be 
subject to state influence with relationship-specific investment in exploration, pipelines, 
and refining capacity.4 Under this hold-up risk hypothesis, the political effects should 
be larger for exporting countries with higher expropriation risk, and only firms with oil 
investment overseas is expected to respond to international politics. To the extent that 
developing countries tend to be nondemocratic and associated with higher expropriation 
risk, one may expect changes in international politics has a larger effect on oil exports 
from these developing countries. 
However, a more careful examination of import decision of individual firms 
reveal that large oil-importing firms with investment overseas are less responsive to 
changes in international politics in the short run, perhaps because these firms are likely 
                                                   
4 A related reason why oil is only partially fungible is that oil has to be refined, and refineries are built to 
handle specific types of oil. For example, according to the EIA, “Venezuela’s crude oil is heavy and sour 
by international standards, and hence a significant fraction of the Venezuela’s oil production must go to 
specialized domestic and international refineries” (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/venezuela/oil.html). 
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to committed to term contracts (Kashcheeva and Tsui, 2014). If these 
vertically-integrated firms tend to have investment in developing but oil-rich countries, 
oil exports from these developing countries can be less sensitive to changes in 
international politics at least in the short run. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents 
our initial evidence on the effects of international politics on oil imports from American 
firms. Our main results focusing on oil exports from developing countries are presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We combine data from the following sources for our analysis. First, our firm-level crude 
oil imports data are taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The 
EIA dataset provides monthly oil imports data by transaction since 1986. We use this 
dataset to construct annual oil imports figure by firm.  
Data on political distance between country pairs are obtained from Dreher and 
Sturm (2012), which provides indices of political distance based on voting positions of 
country pairs in the United Nations General Assembly from 1970-2008. In particular, 
our measure of political distance, which lies between 0 and 1, is calculated as d/dmax, 
where d is the sum of metric distances between votes by a country-pair in a given year 
and dmaxis the largest possible metric distance for those votes.5 For instance, when two 
countries always cast the same vote for any proposal, their political distance is zero. 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that UN votes are a reliable indication of the political 
alliances between countries, because the pattern of UN votes is strongly correlated with 
                                                   
5 Votes are coded as either 1 (“yes” or approval for an issue), 2 (abstain), or 3 (“no” or disapproval for an 
issue). 
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alliances and similarity of economic and geopolitical interest. Unlike other indices based 
on alliance portfolios, UN voting-based indices provide significant time-series variation 
in political distance. Following Dreher and Sturm (2012) and the majority of the 
literature, we focus on all votes (i.e., including both key and non-key votes). 
Data on standard gravity controls are taken from various sources. GDP and 
population data are taken from the Penn World Table. Our oil reserves data are 
obtained from EIA and BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Finally, data on 
expropriation risk in the oil industry are taken from Guriev, Kolotilin, and Sonin (2011), 
which provides a list of oil nationalizations, including formal nationalization, 
intervention, forced sale, and contract renegotiation. 
In the full sample, we have 149,801 observations from 60 exporting countries. 
The descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analysis are summarized in 
Table 1. 
3. Political Limits on Oil Imports 
In our analysis we employ the standard workhorse model in international trade: the 
gravity equation, which links trade flows between countries to distance between them 
and their (economic and/or demographic) sizes. Distance in this model is understood 
quite generally. It includes not only geographical distance but also could account for 
other factors that reduce trade. In our paper we focus on political relations as 
impediment to trade. 
In its multiplicative constant-elasticity form, the gravity equation for trade 
states that oil import of firm  from country  to the United States at year , denoted 
by  is inversely proportional to their distance  (which typically includes all 
factors that might create trade resistance), and proportional to the product of the two 
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countries’ GDPs, denoted by  and : 
(1)   , 
where , , , and  are unknown parameters, and  is an error term. Provided 
 is strictly positive, we can log-linearizing the above equation to obtain the standard 
representation of gravity equation: . Our 
point of departure from the traditional gravity model is our focus on international 
politics, and hence  measures the one-year lag of political distance between the 
United States and country  at year . The coefficient of interest is , the estimated 
impact of US foreign relations on the log of oil imports to the United States. Because 
crude oil export depends on oil endowment, we also control for oil reserves. In our first 
specification, we control for country fixed effects and country ’s population. In our 
second specification, we also control for year fixed effects. Adding year fixed effects 
captures all time-specific characteristic (e.g., global oil price, as well as US GDP, oil 
reserves, etc.). In our full specification, we also control for firm fixed effects. 
One consequence of the log-linearization is that zero trade observations are 
dropped from the sample. Because our focus is on oil imports of firms and the 
distribution of oil endowment is highly uneven across countries, the number of 
observations dropped is indeed quite large. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), 
we estimate the multiplicative form (1) using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
(PPML) estimator. The main advantages of the PPML estimator are that while it 
provides a natural way to deal with zero values of the dependent variable, it is also 
consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2 present the results using the full sample. The first row 
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reports the estimates of the political distance coefficient, our variable of interest. In all 
the three specifications, there is a negative and statistically significant association 
between our measure of political distance and oil imports. In our full specification, for 
example, a point estimate of -1.176 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
political distance (0.122) is associated with a reduction in oil imports by 13 percent.6 
4. Political Limits on Oil Imports from Developing Countries 
To examine the heterogeneity in responses according to the characteristics of the 
oil-exporting countries, we first divide the sample into countries with and without 
experience of expropriation over the sample period. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 replicate 
the estimates using the full sample. The rest of the table shows that, consistent with the 
hold-up risk hypothesis, the political effect on oil imports is indeed driven by countries 
with higher expropriation risk, measured by experience of expropriation. 
We next divide the sample into countries according to their stage of development. 
Our main results are summarized in Table 4. The estimates using the subsample of the 
lowest-income countries are reported in column 1. The next two columns report the 
estimates using the subsamples of middle- to highest-income countries, according to the 
World Bank definition. Interestingly, the short-run responses are significant in both the 
lowest and the highest income group, but not in the middle-income group. However, 
when we examine the dynamic responses by allowing for longer lags, column 4 to 
column 6 show that among the highest-income countries the political effect on oil trade 
are most significant in the short run, whereas among the lower-income countries 
(especially the middle-income group) the political effect on oil trade are more significant 
                                                   
6 Implied responses to changes in political distance are computed as: exp(∆x*β)-1, where ∆x is change in 
distance measure in question and β is estimated coefficient.  
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only after a few-year lag. In other words, international politics is relevant to 
oil-exporting developing countries, especially in the long run. 
5. Interpretations and Policy Implications 
Why international politics appears to affect oil-exporting developing countries more in 
the long run? First, we should notice that oil expropriation happened in countries with 
different stages of development in our sample. For example, due to the wave of 
nationalization in the oil sector during the 1970s, high-income countries today such as 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are classified as countries with expropriation experience in 
our sample. Two countries, namely Russia and Venezuela, who expropriate the oil sector 
after the turn of the century are classified as middle-income countries. Bolivia is a 
low-income country that expropriate recently. To the extent that developing countries 
are more likely to expropriate in the modern times, the finding that international 
politics appears to affect them more in the long run is consist with the hold-up risk 
hypothesis that firms reduce their oil imports from these countries with higher political 
risk in the long run.  
Our findings, therefore, suggest that focusing on short-run response in oil 
exports from developing countries may understate the importance of international 
politics in shaping oil trade. While these countries may gain financially in the short run, 
in the longer run these developing countries will suffer from more volatile exports and 
hence government revenue due to changes in international politics. To the extent that 
national saving and investment co-move with oil revenue in these countries, 
international politics can also affect long-term development in the developing world. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
 
Sample : 149801 observations, 1986-2008 
     
Oil Imports 350.048 4061.913 0 197479 
Political distance (UNGA voting) 0.757 0.122 0.272 0.956 
Log exporter’s oil reserves 1.191 2.577 -5.006 5.587 
Log exporter’s GDP 8.495 1.180 5.117 11.646 
Log exporter’s population 9.599 1.707 5.328 14.091 
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Table 2: Political Distance and Oil Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Political distance -1.298*** -1.180*** -1.176*** 
 (0.284) (0.454) (0.453) 
Oil reserves 0.027 0.035 0.034 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) 
GDP 0.466*** 0.456* 0.459* 
 (0.166) (0.255) (0.256) 
Population 0.545 -0.187 -0.188 
 (0.461) (0.799) (0.799) 
    
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes 
Obs (# of countries) 148254(60) 148254(60) 148254(60) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated using PPML 
method. Political distance is measured with a 1-year lag. Other control variables are measured in log. 
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Table 3: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Response Heterogeneity by Exporter’s Expropriation Risk 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Political distance -1.298*** -1.180*** -1.176***  -1.165*** -1.367*** -1.365***  -1.691* 0.132 0.140 
 (0.284) (0.454) (0.453)  (0.274) (0.413) (0.412)  (0.980) (3.028) (3.030) 
Oil reserves 0.027 0.035 0.034  0.043 0.044 0.044  0.029 0.014 0.014 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031)  (0.028) (0.040) (0.040)  (0.063) (0.080) (0.080) 
GDP 0.466*** 0.456* 0.459*  0.419** 0.354 0.356  0.551 0.747 0.748 
 (0.166) (0.255) (0.256)  (0.189) (0.333) (0.332)  (0.414) (0.554) (0.555) 
Population 0.545 -0.187 -0.188  0.553 -0.296 -0.297  0.845 2.054 2.064 
 (0.461) (0.799) (0.799)  (0.475) (0.976) (0.976)  (1.318) (1.499) (1.501) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes  No No Yes  No No Yes 
Obs (# of 
countries) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
148254 
(60) 
 73646 
(28) 
73646 
(28) 
73646 
(28) 
 74608 
(32) 
74608 
(32) 
74608 
(32) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions are estimated using PPML 
method. Political distance is measured with a 1-year lag. Other control variables are measured in log. In columns 
(1)-3), the regressions are estimated based on the full sample. In columns (4-(6) only imports from the countries 
with the history of expropriations are included in the subsample, and in columns (7)-(9) the subsample includes the 
rest of the countries. The results of the regression presented in Column (9) should be interpreted with caution 
because the estimates for the firm fixed effects were not properly estimated. 
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Table 4: Political Distance and Oil Imports: Response Heterogeneity by Exporters’ Stage of 
Development 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Political distancet-1  -2.939** -1.723 -3.00**  -0.697 -1.384 -1.780** 
 (1.188) (2.562) (1.320)  (0.503) (0.970) (0.721) 
Political distancet-2 - - -  -0.562 -0.677 -1.396** 
 - - -  (0.618) (1.395) (0.674) 
Political distancet-3 - - -  -0.681 -1.430* 0.657 
 - - -  (0.972) (0.797) (0.780) 
Political distancet-4 - - -  -1.213 -0.551 -0.230 
 - - -  (0.965) (1.525) (0.547) 
Political distancet  - - -  -1.958*** 0.591 -1.794* 
 - - -  (0.741) (1.807) (0.967) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 0.250
* 0.035 0.007  0.060 0.034 0.013 
 (0.141) (0.044) (0.037)  (0.108) (0.039) (0.026) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.792 0.941** 0.289  1.114 1.151*** 0.386 
 (0.493) (0.457) (0.301)  (0.532) (0.408) (0.386) 
Log exporter’s 
population 4.175
* -6.115** 0.314  4.048 -6.928** 0.299 
 (2.344) (2.864) (0.578)  (2.478) (3.198) (0.801) 
        
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (# of countries) 44624(19) 53901(22) 36047(14)  39269(19) 45097(21) 31407(14) 
Note: Country-level cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regressions in columns (1) and (4) are 
estimated based on the subsample of countries that were classified as low-income and lower-middle-income 
according to the 1999’s World Bank definition, the regressions in columns (2) and (5) are estimated based on the 
subsample of countries that were classified as upper-middle income, the regressions in columns (3) and (6) are 
estimated based on the subsample of countries that were classified as high income. The list of low-income and 
lower-middle-income countries are: Angola, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, China, Cote d`Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, 
Dem. Rep., Congo, Republic of, Georgia, Indonesia, India, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, 
Chad, Vietnam, and Yemen. The list of upper-middle-income countries are: Argentina, Belarus, Belize, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Peru, Russia, 
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela, and South Africa. The list of high-income countries are: Australia, Brunei, 
Denmark, Spain, Gabon, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
and Trinidad & Tobago. 
 
